Does Vietnam\u27s Entry into WTO Accelerate Its Trade Liberalization? by Ni Bin
̶     ̶231
Does Vietnam’s Entry into WTO Accelerate Its Trade Liberalization?
Does Vietnam’s Entry into WTO Accelerate  
Its Trade Liberalization?
Bin Ni†
This paper tries to empirically investigate how Vietnam’s entry into World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 2007 affects its trade with partners around the world. Making use of this quasi-experiment set-
ting and applying a gravity framework, this research differentiates countries with free trade agreement 
(FTA) from those without FTA at the time of entry, and shows that the accession leads to a larger trade 
volume from the countries without FTAs, thus indicating the positive impact of this epoch-making event 
on Vietnam’s overall trade liberalization. The findings have been verified even after the endogeneity issue 
and other economic shocks are taken into account. 
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1.　Introduction
Ever since the Doi Moi economic reform launched by the government, Vietnam has witnessed a re-
cord high economic growth. In addition, Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 
2007 in search of its integration into the world’s economy. The entry into WTO has earned Vietnam 
the access to the global markets and initiated the need to promote further domestic reforms on exter-
nal commitments. However, the entry does not guarantee the surge in total trade volume (bilateral 
trade, including both export and import). In accordance with the entry, Vietnam has to comply with 
many agriculture-related regulations (e.g. to remove the subsidy on agriculture exports), which might 
negatively affect its own export to the rest of the world. On the other hand, the overall import duties 
will be cut from average 17.4％ to 13.4％, and one-third of the total 10,600 tariffs will be reduced or 
removed within 5 to 7 years after the entry,1 resulting in a huge increase in imports. Thus the influence 
of the WTO accession on Vietnam’s overall trade will become hard to predict.
In this study, I will embed the evaluation of this economic shock into a gravity framework, which 
has been widely used in the context of international trade. Since the negotiation before the accession 
has gone through a lengthy process and makes the timing for Vietnam to join WTO uncertain, it pro-
vides an ideal quasi-experiment setting for the identification. I use the ex ante free trade agreement as 
a benchmark and divided Vietnam’s trade partners into those with FTA (control) and without FTA 
(treated) before Vietnam’s entry, since countries without FTA are more likely to be affected by the tar-
iff cut associated with joining WTO. A difference-in-difference (DID) model will be estimated while 
† Corresponding author. The Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University. Nishi-Waseda Bldg. 612, 1‒21‒1 Nishi- 
Waseda, Shinjyuku-ku, Tokyo 169‒0051 Japan. Tel: ＋81‒3‒3200‒2437. Email: jiadaniel@hotmail.com
1 The statistics are drawn from the WTO official site. https://www.wto.org/
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controlling for the bilateral economic characteristics that might affect the trade volume between 
Vietnam and its partners. By so doing, the sole impact of Vietnam’s accession on international trade 
can be pinned down. For robustness check, a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) is applied 
to account for the possible truncation bias incurred by the zero-trade observations. Furthermore, an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach is employed to alleviate the potential endogeneity of FTA, and 
several other placebo tests are conducted to confirm the results. These efforts combined allow us to 
reach a unanimous conclusion that Vietnam’s entry into WTO does have a positive impact on increas-
ing its overall trade with the partners around the world. 
The contribution of this paper can be threefold. First, although there are many studies that investi-
gate the impact of Vietnam’s entry into WTO, the quantitative research to explore the relationship be-
tween Vietnam’s accession and trade volume is surprisingly rare. This paper will thus fill in the blank. 
Second, this paper combines the DID methodology with a gravity framework, which serves as the pio-
neer in this field. Third, the endogeneity issue has been carefully dealt with to ensure the robustness of 
the findings, which provides solid evidence to supplement the existing qualitative studies. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the process of Vietnam’s entry into WTO. 
Section 3 introduces relevant previous literature. Section 4 describes the estimation strategy and data. 
Section 5 presents the results and some robustness checks. Finally section 6 concludes.
2.　Vietnam’s entry into WTO and its trade situation
Vietnam’s recent economic development is thought to be attributable to two major events. As previ-
ously mentioned, Vietnam’s fast growth (nearly 8％ per year on average over the last two decades) has 
been initiated by the implementation of Doi Moi in 1986. Afterwards, the export-oriented growth 
strategy brought the need to open up the domestic market, which led to Vietnam’s incentive to seek 
Figure 1　Vietnam’s total bilateral trade (million US dollars)
Source: UNCTADStat.
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the possibility of joining the WTO. In early 2007, Vietnam finally gained access to WTO, thus becom-
ing the first emerging Asian country to join the WTO since China in the new century, however, the ac-
cession negotiation process took nearly twelve years (Cling et al. 2008). 
As can be seen from Figure 1, there has been a surge of bilateral international trade in Vietnam after 
2004. Though there was a drop in between 2008‒2009, it is quite likely that this phenomenon was 
caused by the global economic crisis. Excluding the exception noted above, a consistent increase in 
trade volume can be observed. 
Nevertheless, it is known that the WTO accession can bring both opportunities and challenges. Ac-
cording to the study conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development’s IPSARD, the in-
tegration brings about more opportunities for Vietnam’s agriculture, since the agricultural products will 
become easier to enter the foreign market. On the other hand, the openness means that the Vietnamese 
producers and traders are facing more risks and competition from the world market.2 Under such cir-
cumstances, it is difficult to predict whether the accession will have an effective impact on enhancing 
Vietnam’s total trade turnover, as the government has expected. In other words, it should not be taken 
for granted that the increase in trade volume shown in Figure 1 is due to Vietnam’s entry into WTO. As 
such, the WTO’s sole impact on trade becomes intriguing, especially for the decision makers of the Viet-
namese government. In this paper, I will attempt to unveil the fact using an empirical approach. 
3.　Literature review
There has been a sea of studies that investigates how trade liberalization affects the economy in the 
host country ever since the creation of WTO in 1995. They can be divided into two major groups: i) 
the impact on economic growth, and ii) the impact on inequalities and poverty. For the former, Fran-
kel and Rose (2002), Subramanian and Wei (2003) all used gravity model, but came up with quite op-
posite conclusions. Another approach is to apply computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to 
simulate the influence after a certain country gains membership of WTO, e.g. Bchir et al. (2002), Cling 
et al. (2009). The second group of studies consists of Bourguignon (2003), Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2007), etc., which also indicate mixed results. 
When it comes to the case of Vietnam, most studies have found positive impact of Vietnam’s entry 
into WTO,3 such as Dimaranan et al. (2005), Roland-Holst et al. (2002), Tarp Jensen and Tarp (2005). 
All of them use simulation methodology to show that trade liberalization of Vietnam can increase its 
GDP by 5‒10％, however, the actual GDP growth after the WTO accession is way beyond that figure. 
The same trend can be found when the focus is on post-WTO export and import. One thing in common 
2 For example, according to the WTO, Vietnam has committed to remove subsidy on agricultural exports and set ceilings on 
duties ranging between 0‒35％ for the majority of goods. Meanwhile, quotas, bans, and other restrictions will be abolished, 
including import bans on cigarette, cigars, and used vehicles, or only applied according to WTO rules. Governmental interfer-
ence will become less frequent since commercial business are to be conducted on commercial terms only.
3 Nguyen and Ezaki (2005) use the GTAP CGE model to simulate the impact of Vietnam’s membership, but indicate negative 
result.
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for these studies is that they all use simulation methodology to estimate the influence, but they suffer 
from obvious shortcomings (Cling et al. 2008): they use unrealistic model specifications and the simula-
tions are based on reduction in tariffs, but assuming that all the other factors are kept unchanged.
Thus this paper will employ a different approach by evaluating the impact of Vietnam’s accession 
into WTO based on real data. The detailed estimation strategy will be described in the next section.
4.　Estimation and data
Gravity equation
The estimation model is derived from a gravity framework, as pioneered by Tinbergen (1962): 
 Tij＝α0YiYjDijηij (1)
In analogous to Newton’s law of gravitation, Tij, the bilateral trade flow between country i and coun-
try j, is proportional to the product of each country’s GDP, denoted by Y, and their economic distance 
Dij, which covers all the factors that “contribute” to the trade resistance. ηij is an error term, which is as-
sumed to be independent of all the other control variables, thus E(Tij|Yi, Yj, Dij)＝α0YiYjDij.
After applying log transformation, equation (1) becomes: 
 lnTij＝lnα0＋lnYi＋lnYj＋lnDij＋lnηij (2)
Identification strategy
Based on the definition of Vietnam Trade Promotion Agency, there are essentially three kinds of tax 
rates for imported goods: normal rate, the most favored nation rate, and special preferential tax rate. 
The most favored nation rates are applicable to import goods originating from countries that apply the 
most favored nation treatment in their trade relations with Vietnam. Since almost all the trade part-
ners of Vietnam fall into this category, there is not much variation among countries. In the meantime, 
the special preferential tax rates, referring to the lowest level of import tax, are applicable to import 
goods originating from countries that apply special preferences on import tax to Vietnam, i.e. the 
countries that have signed free trade agreement (FTA) with Vietnam. At present Vietnam has signed 
16 FTAs in total, however, by the time Vietnam became an official member of WTO in 2007, only two 
FTAs came into effect̶ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with Common Effective Preferential Trading 
Tariff and ASEAN-China Free Trade Area with the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement.4 
Since Vietnam has committed to a tariff cut in imported goods upon its entry into WTO, the coun-
tries that originally did not receive the special preferential tax rates are expected to benefit the most 
from this practice and change their trade pattern with Vietnam. The variation in trade liberalization 
and timing of tariff reduction provides an ideal setting to conduct a difference-in-difference analysis, to 
compare the countries that benefited the most (treated group) before and after 2007 with those that 
4 The statistics are obtained from Asia Regional Integration Center of Asian Development Bank. 
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have previously enjoyed the preferential tax rate (control group). The same methodology can be seen in 
Lu and Yu (2015), Guadalupe and Wulf (2010). The specification for the DID estimation thus becomes:
 lnTij＝lnα0＋βTariffi*treated・Post07t＋lnYi＋lnYj＋lnDij＋lnηij (3)
The baseline estimation in this study will be using equation (3). Because the focus is on the trade vol-
ume between Vietnam and its partners, it is only necessary to control the tariff heterogeneity among 
the other countries, as denoted by j. The dependent variable will be the logarithm of the sum of export 
and import between Vietnam and country j. Tariffi*treated is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if 
country j is the beneficiary of the special preferential tax rate.5 Post07t denotes a post-WTO period, 
taking a value of 1 if it is year 2007 and onwards, and 0 otherwise. I use the interaction term as the 
main regressor of interest, because it can capture both the real and expected effects of WTO entry, as 
argued by Liu and Trefler (2011). As for other control variables that contribute to the economic dis-
tance Dij, I include the real geographical distance between the country pairs, two dummy variables that 
show whether two countries share the border and common political regime.6 In addition, country pair 
and year fixed effects will be included to control for the economic shock across time and location. 
Data
The data used in this paper comes from several sources. The information for GDP and GDP per 
capita (measured in current USD) in each country is drawn from the World Development Indicator of 
World Bank, ranging from 1995 to 2014. 
The information for imports and exports of goods by country and Year are extracted from General Sta-
tistics Office, Vietnam, which covers 75 trade partners. The amounts are denominated in million USD. 
The distance is the real geographical measurement of the distance between the capital city of each 
trading country (kilometer). For detailed statistical summary, see Table 1. 
5 The countries include China and the rest nine members of ASEAN: Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
6 Only three countries share the border with Vietnam: China, Laos and Cambodia. As for political regime, China and Laos are 
of the same communist government as Vietnam. 
Table 1　Statistical summary 















N 1122 4140 4032 4032 4320 4320 4320 4320
mean 1715.499 9509.985 2.58E＋11 11315.6 7.49E＋10 881.0769 0.0138889 0.0092593
sd 4535.601 4486.681 1.08E＋12 18824.94 5.20E＋10 559.9741 0.1170434 0.0957896
min 0.9 392.1 1.10E＋07 64.81015 2.07E＋10 288.0203 0 0
max 58641.5 19366 1.74E＋13 193648.1 1.86E＋11 2052.319 1 1
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5.　Estimation results and robustness check
Baseline results
The results for applying equation (3) are presented in Table 2. The first two columns show the re-
sults when random effects and fixed effects model are estimated respectively. In both columns, the in-
teraction term Tariffi*treated・Post07 is always positive and significant, showing that the group of coun-
tries that previously do not enjoy the special preferential tax rate tend to increase the trade with 
Vietnam after Vietnam joined WTO. Meanwhile tarifftreated shows negative sign, though not significant, 
indicating that in the long run, regardless of Vietnam’s status in WTO, the special preferential tax rate 
still has a strong promoting effect on enhancing the trade partners’ transaction with Vietnam.
To mitigate the potential bias incurred by applying the log-linearized OLS estimations, especially 
when there are many zeros for trade volume, as pointed out by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), a PPML 
method is applied. The method has the advantage of not relying on normality or homoskedasticity as-
sumptions for the country pairs, whereas biases will be caused by log-linearization in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. As an alternative, I use the level of bilateral trade volume, instead of its log form, as 
the dependent variable. In practice, the variable will be divided by 1000 due to the scale. Column (3) in 
Table 2 shows the result of PPML. Tariffi*treated・Post07 is still positively significant, which is consistent 






lngdp_ restcountry 0.739*** 1.871*** －0.0958
(0.0925) (0.508) (0.571)
lngdpperca_restcountry －0.160 －1.625*** 0.618
(0.139) (0.497) (0.572)












tarifftreated ×Post07 0.385** 0.361* 0.281*
(0.181) (0.198) (0.153)
Observations 1,089 1,089 1,089
Model used Random effects Fixed effects PPML
R-squared 0.851 0.860
Number of newid 61 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-pair distance.
Year dummies are included, but not shown in the results. 
*** p＜0.01, ** p＜0.05, * p＜0.1
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with the OLS estimations. Compared to the originally FTA-signed countries, the group of countries 
that previously did not enjoy the special preferential tax rate tend to increase the trade with Vietnam 
by 28％ after Vietnam gain accession into WTO. 
Robustness checks
There are several issues that require extra care. First, because of the uncertain timing of Vietnam’s 
entry into WTO, the event itself can be considered random. Nevertheless, one might argue that a 
country is likely to change its trade pattern when Vietnam’s accession is expected. Thus the trade vol-
ume might already be adjusted before 2007. As a robustness check and following Lu and Yu (2015), I 
include an additional term, tarifftreated×1 year before WTO entry, to control the possible adjustment by 
the trade partners of Vietnam. Columns (1) and (2) show the estimation results. The added term is not 
significant, however, the variable of interest̶Tariffi*treated・Post07 is still robust to the test. 
Second, concerning the countries that are subject to FTA and special preferential tax rate, they 
might not be randomly selected. Despite the proliferation of FTAs over the past several decades, the 
formation does not happen on a regular basis. According to Bergstrand et al. (2016), among 10,585 




















tarifftreated ×Post07 0.383** 0.364*
(0.190) (0.208)
tarifftreated×1 year before －0.0263 0.0293
(0.123) (0.126)
Observations 1,089 1,089
Model used RE FE
R-squared 0.851 0.860
Number of newid 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-pair distance.
Year dummies are included, but not shown in the results. 
*** p＜0.01, ** p＜0.05, * p＜0.1
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pairings of 146 countries from 1950 through 2006, there are only 1,560 such events. Thus only coun-
tries that meet certain requirements form the alliance. To alleviate the possibility that pre-existing dif-
ferences between treated and control groups might also affect their respective trade pattern even after 
the WTO accession, it is necessary to carefully model this self-selection process by identifying the FTA 
determinants in the pre-WTO period. Studies such as Baier and Bergstrand (2004), Egger and Larch 
(2008), Baldwin and Jaimovich (2009) investigate the factors that might contribute to the formation of 
a free trade agreement. The typical determinants includes: two countries’ economic sizes and their 
economic similarity (defined as the product of gdpi/(gdpi＋gdpj) and gdpj/(gdpi＋gdpj)), bilateral dis-
tance, and relative factor endowments.7 Following their findings, I apply an instrumental variable 
model to take into account the endogeneity of FTAs. To be specific, in the first step I run a logit/probit 
7 Other determinants include distance of a country-pair to the nearest FTA, number of members in the nearest FTA (and its 
square), degree of competitive liberalization. Due to data availability, I do not include them in this paper.





Dependent variable FTA dummy lnbilateral_trade
lngdp_ restcountry －0.222*** －0.439*** 0.736*** 1.906***
(0.0815) (0.145) (0.0942) (0.498)
lngdpperca_restcountry －0.155 －1.656***
(0.138) (0.481)
lngdp_Vietnam 0.275 0.514 47.49 1.315***
(4.065) (7.216) (36.13) (0.147)
lngdpperca_Vietnam －52.36
(40.95)















Observations 2,331 2,331 1,089 1,089
Model used Probit Logit RE FE
R-squared 0.851 0.861
Number of newid 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-pair distance.
Year dummies are included in both stages, but not shown in the results. 
*** p＜0.01, ** p＜0.05, * p＜0.1
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model to decide on the extra FTA determinants. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that GDP, country-pair 
distance and economic similarity are all important factors to determine the formation of FTAs. In the 
second step I use them as instruments for the special preferential tax rate and explore the impact. The 
results are shown in columns (2) of Table 4. Even after I include the interaction term between econom-
ic similarity and Post07, tarifftreated×Post07 remains positive and significant, which confirms the ro-
bustness of the previous finding.
Finally, one might be concerned about the influence that 2008‒2009 economic crisis will have on 
each country’s trade behavior. To control this external shock, I create a crisis dummy only if it is in be-
tween 2008 and 2009, otherwise it takes the value of 0. The results are presented in Table 5. Regardless 
of whether it is a random effects or fixed effects model, the inclusion of the additional term does not 
change the prediction. 
6.　Conclusions
In this paper, I empirically investigate how Vietnam’s accession into WTO in 2007 affects its trade 
with the partners around the world. A DID econometric method is applied to evaluate the influence of 




















tarifftreated ×Post07 0.452** 0.414*
(0.201) (0.219)





Model used RE FE
R-squared 0.851 0.861
Number of newid 61 61
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by country-pair distance.
Year dummies are included, but not shown in the results. 
*** p＜0.01, ** p＜0.05, * p＜0.1
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this event. The results show that the accession does have a positive impact on increasing the trade vol-
ume between Vietnam and other countries, especially for the countries that previously did not receive 
the special preferential tax rate. The finding is robust even if the possible self-selection of FTAs and 
macro shocks such as the 2008‒2009 global economic crisis is taken into consideration.
This research acts as the first study to rigorously investigate the quantitative impact of Vietnam’s en-
try into WTO on its international trade. Further analysis will be performed on how the accession af-
fects the economic development (e.g. employment, innovation, environment) in Vietnam, and what 
lessons Vietnam can learn to further enhance its integration with the world economy. I will leave these 
to future studies. 
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